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Abstract 
Enrique Dussel and John Dewey share commitments to philosophical theory and 
practice aimed at addressing human problems, democratic modes of inquiry, and 
progressive social reform, but also maintain productive differences in their 
fundamental starting point for political philosophy and their use of the social 
sciences. Dussel provides a corrective to Dewey’s Eurocentrism and to his tendency 
to underplay the challenges of incorporating marginalized populations by insisting 
that social and political philosophy begin from the perspective of the marginalized 
and excluded. Simultaneously, Dewey encourages a modest experimental and 
fallibilist approach to social transformation that promises more feasible social 
reforms than Dussel’s approach rooted in phenomenology and the critical social 
sciences. 
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Our goal in this paper is to contribute to the construction of an American 
philosophy – not a philosophy of the United States, but an American 
philosophy that spans the continent from Argentina to Nunavut. Our strategy 
is to use the liberation philosophy articulated most prominently by Enrique 
Dussel and bring it into closer contact with the work of John Dewey. Enrique 
Dussel has suggested that “a return of the great philosophical theses of 
pragmatism is salutary, but this return will not be possible if the pragmatism 
of the North does not open up to a necessary dialogue with the 
impoverished, exploited, and excluded South.” (Dussel 2013, 160) Dewey 
provides a promising focal point for this dialogue. Dewey and Dussel share 
commitments to philosophical theory and practice aimed at addressing 
human problems, democratic modes of inquiry, and progressive social 
reform, but also have productive differences in their fundamental starting 
point for political philosophy and their use of the social sciences. 
Though the parallels between the Philosophy of Liberation and American 
Pragmatism have not gone unremarked (Pappas 2011; Stehn 2011a; Stehn 
2011b), they merit further development. Pragmatist philosophers – including 
Dewey and his heirs – have neglected the Global South and have been too 
sanguine about including marginalized groups in developed states, 
illegitimately narrowing the scope of who is included in democratic dialogue 
and the set of problems addressed. Dussel provides a corrective to Dewey’s 
Eurocentrism and his tendency to underplay the challenges of incorporating 
marginalized populations by insisting that social and political philosophy 
begin from the perspective of the marginalized and excluded. 
Simultaneously, Dewey’s conception of democracy provides resources – most 
prominently a practical conception of democracy intimately connected to a 
pedagogical theory – for contextualizing and constructing North-South 
dialogues and social movements. Deweyian democracy encourages a modest 
experimental and fallibilist approach to social transformation that meets 
Dussel’s insistence on political feasibility better than Dussel’s approach 
rooted in phenomenology and the critical social sciences. 
Dussel and Dewey in Dialogue 
Enrique Dussel’s philosophy emerges through explicit dialogue with other 
figures. His engagement in the 1970s with Emmanuel Levinas informed 
Philosophy of Liberation (1980/85) and his essays on Karl-Otto Apel, Richard 
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Rorty, and Charles Taylor in The Underside of Modernity (1996) serve as 
fodder and as foils for his recent philosophy. Indeed, Ethics of Liberation in 
the Age of Globalization and Exclusion can be read as an exegesis and 
reconstruction of much of the philosophical tradition to construct a critical, 
non-Eurocentric philosophy. Given the breadth and depth of his engagement 
with the tradition, it surprising how little Dussel has explored John Dewey’s 
ethical and political philosophy.1 Dewey receives no mention in Twenty 
Theses on Politics. Two volumes of Política de la liberación contain only a 
single offhand remark of Dewey as a proponent of “democratic pragmatism” 
(Dussel 2009: 436). The Philosophy of Liberation (1980/1985) contains two 
disparaging remarks of Dewey as a follower of Rousseau and a propagandist 
of bourgeois culture. Though Dussel draws on American pragmatism as a 
resource in Ethics of the Liberation in the Age of Globalization and 
Exclusion, he focuses on the contributions of C.S. Peirce and Hilary Putnam. 
The attention to these two figures without serious attention to Dewey is 
surprising. Peirce wrote little on ethics and on political philosophy and 
Putnam is much better known for his contributions in other areas. 
This absence is more remarkable given that liberation philosophy and 
Dewey’s pragmatism share striking similarities. First, Dussel and Dewey 
share a commitment to naturalism, grounding their moral and political 
philosophy in a conception of human beings as animals in the natural world.2 
For Dussel the universal principle of all ethics is “the obligation to produce, 
reproduce, and develop the concrete human life of each ethical subject in a 
community.” (Dussel 2013, 55) At the basis of their ethics is human need. 
Dussel acknowledges the continuity between Liberation Philosophy and 
Pragmatism on this point with a quote from Hilary Putnam: 
 
1 Our interpretation of Dussel rests primarily on his work after the publication of Philosophy of 
Liberation in 1977. In our view, Dussel’s position has shifted significantly through his analysis 
of Marx and his engagement with discourse ethics. We focus here on Ethics of Liberation in 
the Age of Globalization and Exclusion, the two published volumes of his Política de la 
liberación, Twenty Theses on Politics, and his essays that anticipate and develop themes 
from the Ethics of Liberation. 
2 Contra Ofelia Schutte (1991), we consider Dussel’s ethics and politics of liberation to be 
autonomous from his contributions to theology of liberation. Though philosophy of the 
liberation is influenced by radical Catholic social thought, its justification and content do 
not rely on revelation. For a useful discussion of the relationship between liberation theory 
and liberation philosophy, see Márquez 2010. 
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Ruth Anna Putnam, following the line of John Dewey [or Marx {Dussel’s 
insertion}], appeals at this point to the notion of a need. It is because 
there are real human needs and not merely desires, that it makes sense 
to distinguish between better and worse values, and, for that matter, 
between better and worse… 
quoted in DUSSEL 2013, 171 
In Human Nature & Conduct (MW 14),3 Dewey presents a genealogy of ethics 
which bears striking similarities to Dussel’s notions of human need. Dewey 
sees systems of ethics as serving to control human nature and argues most 
ethoi impose structures contrary to human nature as a means of securing 
oligarchic control (6). By rooting our moral inquiries at the level of humans 
transacting with their biological and cultural environment, we can develop 
methods of inquiry that allow us to diagnose problems accurately, and 
provide a “fund of growing knowledge” (12). 
Second, Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Liberation both take 
experience as the point of departure for ethics and political philosophy 
(Stehn 2011a, 25). Indeed, Pappas summarizes the initial and enduring affinity 
for Dewey in the Hispanic world as based on his “concern with practical lived 
experience; the conception of the individual as an organic whole and active 
in social relationships; and the importance of education as a process for 
living in the present and transforming society in a democratic direction” (8). 
Dewey explains this connection between experience and democracy as 
follows: 
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode 
of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The 
extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an 
interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to 
consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is 
equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and 
national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of 
their activity… They secure a liberation of powers which remain 
 
3 Citations of Dewey are to the published works are by volume and page number of the critical 
edition, The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (The Middle 
Works: 1898–1924 [MW], and The Later Works, 1925–1953 [LW]). 
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suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must 
be in a group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests. 
MW 9, 94 
Thus, for Dewey democracy is not merely a system of government, but a way 
of life that is continuous with education and lived experience. Furthermore, 
experience is social and created through communication and democracy 
flourishes when it is inclusively informed by the diverse ways of life it 
represents. 
A third related point is that Dussel and Dewey share a commitment to 
democracy as the fundamental method and mechanism for social progress. 
Both see democracy as the most legitimate, effective, and empirical means 
for social organization and conflict-resolution. Dussel states that “Democracy 
is a perpetually unfinished system,” a way of life that requires continual 
reconstruction and experimentation (Dussel 2008, 51). For Dussel, legitimacy 
has its basis in the people whose will is mediated by institutions. On his 
account, democracy… 
…is an institutionalization of those mediations that allow legitimate 
decisions, actions, institutions, and delegated exercise of power. These 
are implemented through systems of empirical institutions that are 
invented, tested, and corrected by humanity throughout the millennia 
in order to achieve a strong measure of approval by the citizenry. 
DUSSEL 2008, 62 
This echoes Dewey’s conception of democracy as the best social arrangement 
for directing human nature towards cooperative problem solving, the pursuit 
of common interests, and scientific inquiry. Dewey’s political philosophy 
aims at the reconstruction of democracy so that it pervades all aspects of 
society – in the context of the United States, moving from Lyndon Johnson’s 
Great Society to a Great Community, “a society in which the ever-expanding 
and intricately ramifying consequences of associated activities shall be 
known in the full sense of that word, so that an organized, articulate Public 
comes into being.” (LW 2, 351) Scholars such as William R. Caspary aptly 
present Dewey as a “participatory democracy theorist” and stress the 
significance of democracy for social relationships and associations founding 
all aspects of human life (Caspary 2000, 8–9). 
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Fourth, Dussel draws inspiration from Paulo Freire’s pedagogy in Ethics of 
Liberation in the Age of Globalization and Exclusion. Though there are 
important differences between Freire and Dewey’s philosophy of education, 
there is also considerable common ground in Dewey’s insistence on 
education allowing for the democratic identification of problems and the 
eventual transformation of society (Betz 1992). Dewey and Freire reject top 
down, elitist reforms in favor of reform driven by the people who have come 
to recognize their own interests through education and choose to participate 
in their own liberation. 
Finally, Dussel and Dewey share a similar space on the left of the political 
spectrum, advocating radical reform. Dussel aims to reconstruct ethics from 
the perspective of the world’s marginalized populations and draws on Marx 
to diagnosis and contest neoliberal social and economic policies and 
institutions, but his goal is transformation through gradual, but radical 
reform. He repeatedly admonishes anarchists who wish to destroy the state, 
insists on the need to build institutions that combine participatory with 
representative democracy, and stresses the imperfection of all actual 
institutions. He writes: 
It is not sufficient to rest with spontaneous movements, with social, 
popular or antisystemic movements; political participation must be 
explicitly defined in the empirical sphere. That the people can demand 
the fulfillment of its needs through proposals put forward by the 
participative community, participate in the determining the budget, 
oversee and inspect the actions of all levels of representation, and, 
ultimately, revoke representatives’ mandates, this signifies real 
participation that has left behind ineffective spontaneism. 
DUSSEL 2011, 20 
Dewey shares similar commitments, placing faith in the experimental 
intelligence of ordinary people and the capacity of universal education to 
equip them with the tools to engage intelligently in politics. The ultimate 
goal of society is “the production of free human beings associating with one 
another on terms of equality” (LW 13, 321). But Richard Bernstein notes, 
Dewey, who “was always skeptical of militant revolution, nevertheless 
advocated radical reform.” (Bernstein 1991, 231) 
Given these similarities, why has Dussel neglected Dewey? One 
unsatisfactory possibility is that Dussel has had limited direct contact with 
Dewey’s work. Indeed, his references to Dewey’s philosophy are often 
LIBERATION PRAGMATISM 7 
CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATISM 13 (2016) 1-22 
through secondary sources (Frank Cunningham for democracy, Richard 
Bernstein for Dewey’s political attitudes) rather than an analysis of Dewey’s 
major texts (Bernstein 1991, Cunningham 2002). Though it may be true that 
Dussel has not ready Dewey deeply or systematically, the question of why 
remains. Dussel’s philosophical range is remarkably broad and we should 
assume that he has reasons for choosing not to immerse himself in the works 
of major figure. Our view is that Dussel’s perception of Dewey is somewhat 
distorted and that he has not fully recognized the resources Deweyean 
pragmatism offers. 
Dussel’s most substantial discussion of Dewey in Ethics of Liberation in 
the Age of Globalization and Exclusion helps to reveal his attitude toward 
Dewey. Though this passage does not explicitly cite Dewey, it helpfully 
reconstructs how Dussel sees the differences between American pragmatism 
and philosophy of liberation: 
In any event, the fundamental intuitions of pragmatism can be fully 
subsumed by an ethics of liberation, but with a difference: if 
pragmatism thinks preferentially from the experience of a scientific 
community, from the natural sciences (from Darwinism, for example), 
and from North American common sense, the ethics of liberation 
thinks primarily from the experience of the practical-political 
community, from the critical social sciences (its critique of global 
political economy, for example), and from the oppressed or excluded of 
the periphery, as well as those in the center. 
DUSSEL 1998/2013, 166 
This passage reveals a difference in perspective and in preferred tools. One of 
the major differences between Dussel and Dewey is that Dussel’s later 
philosophy is deeply informed by his engagement with Marx while Dewey’s 
knowledge of Marx was limited and filtered by Soviet doctrine (Cork 1950). 
Dewey wrote little about global political economy, whereas Dussel is 
influenced by dependency theory and Immanuel Wallerstein’s World 
Systems Theory. Though Dewey’s philosophy is certainly influenced by 
Darwinism (MW 4, 1909) and is arguably informed by North American 
common sense (though it is somewhat unclear what this amounts to), this 
distinction is too stark. Dewey’s democratic thought departs from the 
experience of the practical-political community and is by no means 
scientistic. Moreover, there is nothing about American pragmatism that 
disallows deeper engagement with critical theory and with radical political 
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economy (Frega 2014). Nor is it obvious why liberation philosophy should not 
draw on Darwinianism and other well-established scientific theories where 
relevant. 
A couple sentences later Dussel remarks that “pragmatism could not 
discover the phenomenon of Eurocentrism, because it interpreted the United 
States as the full Western fulfillment of Europe.” (Dussel 2013, 166) A footnote 
to this passage comments on a passage from Reconstruction in Philosophy 
(MW 12, 101–2) in which the discovery of the Americas is recounted from the 
perspective of European explorers. It reads: 
…when Dewey speaks of Modernity with its ‘romantic sense of 
adventure into novelty,’ in which he includes everything from the 
Crusades to ‘the finding and opening up of North and South America’, 
and this latter aspect is perceived as an ‘obvious external fact,’ which 
then belongs to the same ‘tradition of novelties. There is no rupture of 
consciousness of being something different than Europe. … America is 
an object ripe for a romantic ‘finding and opening,’ and not the subject 
of a traumatic conquest or ‘invasion’ that devastated the continent’s 
Amerindian cultures, that included violence commerce in African flesh, 
and so on. Pragmatism is up to now the new and great philosophy of 
the ‘West,’ situated in the ‘hegemonic’ region of the ‘center’ of the world 
system at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
DUSSEL 2013, 541n64 
On this interpretation, Dewey’s thought derives from the perspective of the 
dominant power and is blind to its effects on the victims of imperialism and 
colonialism.4 Dewey claims universality while unwittingly assuming the 
perspective of those in power, whereas liberation philosophy consciously 
begins from the perspective of the excluded and oppressed. As a result, 
Dewey’s pragmatism attempts to reform the existing system without offering 
redress to its victims, whereas liberation philosophy aims to transform the 
system by bringing the victims into the democratic process as equals. 
Is this criticism is fair to Dewey? Dussel does not believe that moral and 
political ideas can be divorced from their geopolitical and historical context 
(Dussel 2013, 47). He identifies pragmatism as “the philosophy of the United 
 
4 For a discussion of this possibility, see Margutti 2013. 
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States” (Dussel 2013, 160) and the United States is the center of the world 
system. At the turn of the century, William James could deliver his Gifford 
lectures as a New World interloper. Dewey lived until the middle of the 
twentieth century and established himself as the American philosophy 
during a time when the United States had become the leading world power. 
Arguably, his conviction that Dewey approaches the Americans from the 
perspective of the European colonizer, has led Dussel to no see a need to 
immerse himself in Dewey’s work. 
This speculation on the possibility of Dussel’s geopolitical stance 
contributing to his relative neglect is supported by Gregory Pappas who has 
noted that pragmatism has suffered an uneven reception in Latin America. 
During the early twentieth century pragmatism represented an attractive 
alternative for philosophers of the Americas because it was “empirical and 
informed by the sciences” but “neither scientistic nor reductionistic” thus it 
functioned as an alternative to positivism which was sometimes “used in 
Latin America to justify dictatorships and threaten values and beliefs dear to 
Latin Americans” (Pappas 2011, 4). But by the late twentieth century, 
“negative but mistaken views of pragmatism as a variety of positivism or as a 
shallow American-style utilitarianism” coupled by an “invasion” of 
“existentialism and analytic philosophy” resulted in the eclipse of 
pragmatism until Richard Rorty’s publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (1979) (Pappas 2011, 5). 
Dussel appears to share this negative understanding of pragmatism, an 
understanding reinforced by his dialogue with Richard Rorty who often 
represented himself as a Deweyean. Dussel applauds Rorty’s attention to 
cruelty (Rorty 1989) as a “profoundly ethical attitude” (Dussel 1996, 104) and 
quotes Rorty’s invocation of solidarity as “created by increasing our 
sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, 
unfamiliar sorts of people.” (Dussel 1996, 112, c.f. Rorty xvi) Nonetheless, he 
rejects Rorty’s dismissal of Marx and sees his non-foundationalist, 
hermeneutical ethnocentricism as lacking the tools to move beyond 
conversation to socio-historical and economic-political analyses of injustice. 
For example, Dussel writes the following of his discussion with Rorty on 
Dewey and Marx and the possibility of pragmatism incorporated the critical 
social sciences: 
I asked Rorty at the philosophy institute in Mexico: ‘Pragmatically, in 
Dewey’s sense, speaking, if someone is in misery, in absolute poverty, with a 
salary of 50 dollars a month, with five children, living in a house made of 
cardboard, etc., which language will be ‘pragmatically,’ more useful: either 
the banalization or the serious consideration of Marx’s language which tries 
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to rationally explain the causes of their pain, and who pronounced the ‘law of 
accumulation’ thus: the accumulation of wealth is the reverse of the 
accumulation of misery? Rorty could not but answer that Marx’s language 
would be more useful. With this the entire question of Liberation Philosophy 
becomes clear, at least from the point of view of Dewey’s ‘pragmatism’!” 
(Dussel 1996, 127n110). 
Nonetheless, in a footnote to Ethics of Liberation in the Age of 
Globalization and Exclusion, Dussel suggests “an ethics of liberation could be 
closer to that of a ‘Deweyian pragmatist’ than to that of the ‘aestheticism’ of 
Rorty.” (Dussel 2013, 540n62) This may suggest more of an affinity between 
the two philosophies – or at least openness on the part of Dussel that 
Deweyean pragmatism may not need to be subsumed. 
Toward Liberation Pragmatism 
The parallels between Dewey and Dussel invite dialogue, but the reason for 
bringing them together is that this may address shortcomings in both 
pragmatism and liberation philosophy. Alexander Stehn has remarked that 
the major difference is that classical pragmatism claims to be a philosophy of 
“general experience, when it is actually setting out from a historical 
experience that is located in the privileged center of a global system whose 
development began with the violent colonization (not discovery) of the 
Americas” whereas “Liberation Philosophy begins with the experience of the 
oppressed” (Stehn 2011a, 19). Stehn attempts to show how the two 
philosophies may lead “to the same liberating project of social and political 
reconstruction” and defends pragmatism as “in aspiration, a liberatory 
philosophy of much broader scope and deeper significance” (Stehn 2011a, 25). 
Though we are broadly sympathetic to Stehn’s analysis, he understates 
crucial differences between American Pragmatism and Liberation 
Philosophy. These differences open up the possibility of developing 
conceptual and normative tools for the transformation of social and political 
institutions to be more equitable and to better fulfill human needs. Dussel 
provides a critical philosophy that is alive to how dominant institutions 
exclude, marginalize, and harm the most vulnerable, but his 
phenomenological roots and suspicion of social science strips him of the 
tools for feasible, radical reform. Dewey’s empiricism and experimentalism 
offers tools for implementing and assessing institutional change that aligns 
well with the more successful progressive movements in Latin America. 
Closer contact between American Pragmatism and Liberation Philosophy 
AQ1 
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offers a more robust, democratic, pragmatic philosophy of liberation that 
connects to contemporary social and political movements in Latin America 
and the rest of the world. 
Dussel articulates a critical political philosophy that helps explain how 
new social movements of excluded groups can transform institutions that 
exclude and dominate them. Following the structure of his ethics, Dussel 
divides political philosophy into three spheres, each with its own principle: a 
material principle, a formal principle, and a principle of feasibility (Dussel 
2008, 57–9).5 The material principle is concerned with human needs ranging 
from nourishment and shelter to the need to reproduce culture and to 
participate as a member of the community. It provides the content for 
politics which exists for the promotion of life: “Politics deals with creating the 
conditions of possibility for and advancement of the life of the community 
and each of its members: a possible life, a qualitatively better life.” (Dussel 
2008, 60) The formal principle in politics draws on Apel and Habermas’s 
discourse ethics to develop democratic procedures to ensure legitimacy. 
Dussel adds the requirement that the material and formal elements of a 
political theory must support feasible proposals. Institutions serve as 
“administrative instruments that allow the fulfillment of the specified goals 
of the other two spheres (the material and formal spheres).” (Dussel 2008, 63) 
This feasibility principle unites theory and practice. 
The each of these spheres has a “critical” aspect. All political systems 
exclude and harm part of the population. At the material level, some people 
are hungry, at the formal level, they are voiceless, and at the level of 
feasibility, political institutions do not fulfill their role. A central task for 
radical political philosophy is to participate in the quest for feasible 
institutions that fulfill the material needs of excluded people and give them a 
democratic role. Dussel seeks a 
 
5 We do not engage here Dussel’s rereading of the history of philosophy in the first part of 
Ethics of Liberation and the first volume of Politica de la Liberación that attempts to dispel 
the Eurcentricism of the philosophical tradition. This work is crucial for reorienting 
philosophy to account of the experience and perspective of the periphery. 
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“subjectivized state” in which the citizens will participate to such a 
degree that the existing institutional sphere will shift toward 
transparency, the bureaucracy will be the minimum necessary, while its 
efficacy and instrumentality when it comes to the permanence and 
extension of human life will nevertheless be at a maximum. 
DUSSEL 2011, 32 
How is the transformation of political institutions to be achieved? Dussel 
sees the basis of all political institutions (potestas) as ultimately resting on 
the power of the people (potentia) (Dussel 2008, 26). Transformation 
requires that representative democracy be integrated with participatory 
democracy (Dussel 2008, 128). The aim is to achieve agreement that allows 
the affected to “participate in the fullest way possible … through reasonable 
discussion (without violence) with the highest possible degree of symmetry 
among participants, taking place publicly and according to the democratic 
institutional structure agreed upon beforehand.” (Dussel 2008, 64–5) 
Democracy is an unfinished process, always with unanticipated effects and 
“victims” who are harmed by policies and excluded from decision-making. 
Political institutions pass through stages of development. Initially, they 
appear to respond to unmet demands and needs. When the institutions 
enjoy consensus “which unites wills and binds power as a joint force” (Dussel 
2008, 39), they are defensible. As they mature, they begin to fail to fully fulfill 
some of the functions that justify their existence. Crisis arises when 
institutions become “bureaucratic, self-referential, oppressive, and 
nonfunctional” and are treated as ends in themselves (rather than as 
mechanisms for fulfilling needs) (Dussel 2008, 45). At this stage, consensus 
fades, institutions become coercive, and power becomes fetishized, “self-
grounded on its own despotic will” (Dussel 2008, 34). This leads to popular 
movements that seek to transform them. 
A critical political philosophy should guide us in the process of political 
transformation, changing the system to incorporate more people and to 
remove these bad effects. Political philosophy, on Dussel’s (and on Dewey’s) 
account, should not strive merely to provide regulative ideals to evaluate 
current institutions and reforms. Rather, it should unite theory and practice 
with a keen eye toward feasibility. 
Liberation Philosophy offers pragmatism a perspective that privileges the 
excluded, marginalized populations and a vocabulary that encourages a 
vivid, affective connection to the oppressed. Dewey’s reflections on the 
public often fail to recognize the extent to which significant parts of the 
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population are simultaneously excluded from democratic participation and 
disproportionately harmed by dominant institutions. Dewey’s political 
philosophy acknowledges how powerful groups and institutions exercise 
illegitimate power over others, but rarely discusses this in concrete detail. 
American Pragmatism also tends to have a parochial focus. Though Dussel 
overstates the extent to which pragmatism is complicit in colonial and 
imperial projects, Dewey was very much an American (i.e., from the United 
States) intellectual, despite his writings and travels to Russia, Japan, and 
Mexico. Liberation Philosophy demands a global perspective, something 
which pragmatism has not achieved. 
We see this neglect in Dewey’s discussion of education as an inclusive 
mechanism. Dewey contends that increased contact between diverse groups 
will promote the democratic ideal in terms of “more numerous and more 
varied points of common interest.” (MW 14, 92) He writes: 
The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in 
an interest so that each has to refer his action to that of others, and to 
consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is 
equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and 
national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of 
their activities. 
MW 14, 93 
Dewey is too sanguine in assuming a bedrock of common interest and in 
seeing the inclusion of more people as a straightforward means of breaking 
down social barriers. He neglects how mechanisms of exclusion and 
domination act precisely to reinforce these barriers, at times using the guise 
of neutrality and inclusive rhetoric to avoid structural changes. Dussel’s 
criticisms of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics are 
pertinent here. Procedural mechanisms for justifying norms are only 
effective if everyone has the opportunity to participate and to have their 
voices heard. In practice, many people are excluded from the dominant 
community of communication altogether or find their reasons and 
experience dismissed by the dominant community (Young 2010). Dewey 
shares Apel and Habermas’s blindness to the “the multiple ordinary 
asymmetrical processes of domination of women, discrimination against 
certain races, suffocation of peoples and indigenous cultures, and oppressive 
pedagogical processes.” (Dussel 2013, 295) 
14 SAGER AND SPENCER 
CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATISM 13 (2016) 1-22 
In contrast, Dussel draws on Paulo Freire’s concept of concientizaçao in 
which learners acquire a critical understand of reality through the process of 
popular education (Dussel 2013, 314, c.f. Freire 1970). Though Dewey and 
Freire share many educational ideals and goals (Betz 1992), Freire stresses 
education’s role in awakening and empowering marginalized populations. 
The educational process, conceived by Freire, is a dialogue in which people 
achieve their liberation through a progressive understanding of a reality that 
needs to be transformed. Critical pedagogy leads to “the production of an 
ethical-critical consciousness” that “originates in the victims themselves by 
virtue of their being the privileged historical subjects of their own liberation.” 
(Dussel 2013, 320) On Dussel’s account, “Critical dissent becomes public only 
when it is supported by an organized community of dissenters (the victims) 
who struggle for recognition and who fight against the system’s truth and 
validity in light of the impossibility of living and of their exclusion from the 
discussions that affect them.” (Dussel 2013, 347) 
Dussel’s critical philosophy and global focus serve as a welcome corrective 
to Dewey’s ethics and political philosophy. Where he falls short is in 
providing the tools to realize his ethical vision. His political philosophy often 
takes on an amorphous, metaphysical quality inherited from his 
phenomenological roots. For instance, he tells us that the “ultimate 
foundation of all power” (Dussel 2008, 18) is the community, but that 
“Originary power (potentia) as such is indeterminate (still not-anything), and 
is accordingly with any ‘lack’ but also without real or empirical existence.” 
(Dussel 2008, 19) Potentia is the basis of all power, but it is exercised 
empirical through acts and institutions that may or may not conform to the 
will of the people. At this level of abstraction, it is difficult to know how 
potentia is constituted and what an empirical manifestation of potentia 
might be. Additionally, Dussel’s conception of the people is unclear. He 
writes: 
In the process of creating a hegemonic bloc, the need arises for a 
category that can encompass the unity of all the movements, classes, 
sectors, etc., in political struggle. And so the people [pueblo] is that 
strictly political category (since it is not properly sociological or 
economic) that appears as absolutely essential, despite its ambiguity 
(and indeed this ambiguity does not result from misunderstanding but 
rather from inevitable complexity). 
DUSSEL 2008, 73 
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According to this passage, the people is unified enough to form a hegemonic 
bloc and encompasses all movements, but at the same time is ambiguous 
due to its inevitable complexity. How do we reconcile the contradictions 
here? Dussel continues this passage with a selection from a speech by Fidel 
Castro that refers to the people as the “vast unreedemed masses” (la gran 
masa irredenta) (Dussel 2008, 73) A number of problems arise. 
First, Dussel’s use of the term people is vague and totalizing, reducing 
individuals to a metaphysical category. Despite his protests, it does not allow 
for irreducible pluralism among groups. Who are Castro’s “unreedemed 
masses”? In the passage cited, Castro mentions farm laborers, industrial 
workers, small business men, teachers and professors, and young 
professionals. Dussel mentions that Castro adds abandoned children, 
women, and the elderly in later speeches. It is hard to see how these people 
and their interests and goals fit together. 
Second, Dussel’s abstractions pose problems for a critical political 
philosophy. Dussel’s term “victims” implies passivity “as hungry, poor, 
marginalized, in short, in need of liberation.” (Schutte 1991, 283). Schutte 
continues: “the people remain the object that is thought about rather than a 
group of persons endowed with the capacity to think for themselves, to 
overcome obstacles by their own initiative, to triumph over their oppressors, 
and to rule their own destiny.” (Schutte 1991, 283) This results in “a tendency 
to oversimplify the nature of liberation and of oppression, at a critical 
historical moment when just the opposite of this is what the discipline of 
philosophy ought to accomplish.” (Schutte 1991, 281) Schutte calls for a “more 
realistic standpoint” that takes into account the population’s diversity and 
provides mechanisms for conflict resolution (Schutte 1993, 205). 
Third, Dussel is not particularly interested in actual democratic 
mechanisms, remaining caught at a level of abstraction. He refers to Chapter 
4 of title 2 in the 1999 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as 
a model for this sort of reform (Dussel 2008, 127) and its mix of mechanisms 
“for the participation and the protagonism of the people in exercising its 
sovereignty in the political realm: elections to public posts, referenda, 
popular consultations, revoking mandates, and legislative, constitutional, 
and constituent initiative, open councils, and citizen assemblies whose 
decisions will be binding.” (Dussel 2008, 127) Still, his work does not contain 
any sustained analysis of the effects of Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution which, 
judging by ongoing mass protests against violence, inflation, price controls, 
and corruption and their violent suppression by the Maduro government, 
has hardly been exemplary (Human Rights Watch 2014). Dussel makes 
frequent political statements about social and political policies and 
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institutions, but demonstrates little patience for the difficult empirical task 
of assessing actual practice and policy. 
This seems in part due to a conception of political philosophy as 
autonomous from social science. Dussel writes: 
Political philosophy proposes neither concrete empirical projects nor 
transformations. This task falls to groups of social scientists, political 
parties, and social movements, on the economic and ecological levels, 
in education and health care, etc. Here we can only hope to explain 
principles, the fundamental criteria for transformation in the medium 
term (fifty years, for example), that will see the overcoming of the old 
authoritarian or totalitarian Latin American model as well as the recent 
neoliberal model applied during the last decades of the twentieth 
century. 
DUSSEL 2008, 108 
Dussel’s neglect of the non-critical social sciences deprives him of resources 
for building institutions. Twenty Theses on Politics ends with a ragbag of 
underdeveloped proposals from the creation of a political block between 
South America, Central, America and the Carribean (138), instantiating a 
universal basic income, adopting Sen’s capabilities approach (133) and the 
dissolution of the State in favor a virtual state (118). His remarks on the 
possibility of the need to “democratize communication media” amount to 
little more than platitudes and his suggestion about how an “electronic 
revolution” can allow for citizen participation (Dussel 2008, 132) shows no 
consideration of the many obstacles to high quality, effective participation. 
“community of networks” (Morozov 2011). 
These limitations are problematic according to the standards Dussel sets 
for himself. On Dussel’s account, the ultimate test for an ethical theory is its 
practical application. Unfortunately, his phenomenological and 
hermeneutical roots and his accompanying neglect of mainstream social 
science are a liability for a feasible political philosophy. Dussel’s historical 
reevaluation of the tradition has a vital critical function, but it is of limited 
use in the construction of viable institutions to uphold political 
transformations. 
This goal can be better reached an alliance with Deweyian pragmatism. 
Dewey himself is guilty of often offering general or vague prescriptions 
(MacGilvray 1999, 559) and, as we noted above, imposing an illegitimate 
degree of homogeneity on the population (Talisse 2011). Nonetheless, his 
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experimental method has led his heirs to pursue more concrete and 
empirical work in politics and education.6 In the final section, we explore 
some of this work in the context of Latin American political movements. 
Applications: Pragmatic Democratic Practice in Latin America 
The Philosophy of Liberation would benefit from engagement with the actual 
social movements occurring in Latin America today. Building institutions is 
complicated and their normative evaluation requires empirical study. Latin 
America social movements have achieved widespread success in 
constructing democratic institutions in the face of neoliberal economic 
policies and a historical culture of clientelism. These movements are not 
without tensions and setbacks, in part because el pueblo is not a unified, 
undifferentiated mass, but rather consists of diverse groups with different 
concerns: 
Contemporary Latin America is marked by movements that display a 
diversity of positions and strategies vis-à-vis the state, producing 
promising experiments of transformative politics through dynamic 
state-movement relations, but also disappointments as governments 
have responded to social protests with co-optation, repression and the 
delegitimizing of social movements. 
STOKKE and TÖRNQUIST 2013, 13  
We follow Gregory Pappas as seeing pragmatism as a “Resource in the 
Hispanic Experience for the Twenty-first Century” because it values 
“experience and practice override speculation and dogma,” the “hope of an 
amelioration of concrete problems instead of a faith in inevitable progress,” 
the “importance of the adequacy of means,” a “break with tradition that 
favored reconstruction over revolution,” “education as inseparable from 
 
6 See John Dewey’s Educational Philosophy in International Perspective: A New Democracy 
for the Twenty-First Century. Larry Hickman & Giuseppe Spadafora, eds. (Carbondale, ID: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2009) and Continuing Relevance of John Dewey: 
Reflections on Aesthetics, Morality, Science, and Society. Larry Hickman, Matthew C. 
Flamm, & Krzysztof P. Skowronski, eds. (Editions Rodopi, 2011). 
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political reform,” experimentation, and a rejection of “atomistic 
individualism, certainty, decontextualized rationality, and other 
Enlightenment fictions” (11). Pragmatism’s ideals can be mobilized on behalf 
of a democratic vision as a bottom-up, grass-roots process, and a democratic 
reconstruction that is sensitive to context,” and “trusts people to figure out 
the means to their own liberation” (11). 
Archon Fung has drawn on classical pragmatism, particularly John 
Dewey’s work, as an important precedent for a problem-driven theory of 
democracy that is closely linked to empirical theory. On his account, 
pragmatism provides a valuable theoretical framework because of its 
commitment to the use of reflective intelligence to respond to practical 
problems, its evaluation of institutional design based on their consequences, 
its fallibilism, its commitment to institutional variation and choice, and its 
rejection of a fact-value dichotomy (Fung 2007, 445–6). 
Fung along with Erik Olin Wright and their collaborators have referred to 
the ways in which “ordinary people can effectively participate in and 
influence policies which directly affects their lives” as Empowered 
Participatory Governance (EPG) (Fung and Wright 2003, 5). Their project 
closely parallels Dussel’s prescriptions, but with a commitment to rigorous, 
social science: “EPG presses the values of participation, deliberation, and 
empowerment to the apparent limits of prudence and feasibility.” (Fung and 
Wright 2003, 5)7 
Latin America is a fecund source of political movements and innovations 
that deserve and need assessment. As Dussel has noted, 
Latin American has seen as sort of “political spring” which has been 
developing since the birth of many new social movements – the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the Argentinean piqueteros, the 
movements by the landless and by the coca farmers, the indigenous 
movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, and elsewhere – that have 
come together at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre” 
DUSSEL 2008, XV 
 
7 In an intriguing parallel, Brazilian social and legal theorist Roberto Unger proposes 
“democratic experimentalism” and insists that “Institutional debates and experiments are 
not a separate and subsidiary exercise; they represent our most important way of defining 
and redefining the content of our ideals and interests.” (Unger 1998, 18). Like Dussel, Unger 
advocates “radical reform as a species of transformative politics.” Also see West 1988. 
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These popular movements have sometimes coincided with the rise of 
political leaders on the left such as Nestor Kirchner, Tabaré Vásquez, Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, Hugo Chávez, and Evo Morales. As Dussel recognizes, 
one of the most challenging questions concerns how to combine popular 
movements with representative democracy. 
Leonardo Avritzer and Gianpaolo Baiocchi’s work on participatory 
budgeting in Brazil provides a template for the sort of measures – and 
accompanying research – that might lead to a more sustainable model in the 
spirit of Dewey experimentalism and of Deweyian and Dusselian radical 
reform (Avritzer 2002, 2009, Baiocchi 2003, 2004). In Brazil, an alliance 
between the urban social movements and the Workers’ Party (Partido dos 
Trabalhadoes) led to the widespread rise of participatory institutions, most 
prominently participatory budgeting. Though the success of these 
institutions has varied (Avritzer 2002), these experiments provide an 
opportunity to analyze different conditions and designs. 
This is a project closely connected to the ideals of Deweyean pragmatism 
and congruent with Dussel’s ambitions. What is notable about public 
participation in Brazil and many other places in the developing world is that 
it involves significant sectors of people who have traditionally been excluded 
from political decision making. These social experiments are by no means 
above criticism, but they provide the materials to learn about the creation of 
institutions that allow members of the public a substantial role and voice by 
supporting projects that meet their interests and needs. Engagement with 
empirical work guided by the vision supplied by Dussel’s liberation 
philosophy offers a promising synthesis for a global ethical and political 
philosophy. Likewise, Dewey’s empiricism and experimentalism offers tools 
for implementing and assessing institutional change that aligns well with the 
more successful progressive movements in Latin America. Closer contact 
between American Pragmatism and Liberation Philosophy offers a more 
robust, democratic, pragmatic philosophy of liberation that connects to 
contemporary social and political movements in Latin America and the 
world. 
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Author Queries 
AQ1: Please check the unpaired quotation mark in the sentence “With this the 
entire…Dewey’s ‘pragmatism’!”. 
AQ2: Reference Stokke and Törnquist (2013) is cited in the text but not 
provided in the reference list. Please check. 
AQ3: Please check the unpaired quotation mark in the sentence “Pragmatism’s 
ideals…sensitive to context,” 
AQ4: Please check the unpaired quotation mark in the sentence “Latin 
American has…Porto Alegre”. 
AQ5: Reference Baiocchi (2004) is cited in the text but not provided in the 
reference list. Please check. 
AQ6: Reference Dussel (2007) is provided in the reference list but not cited in 
the text. Please check. 
